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This social science research study examines the chemical weapon attributes associated with 
violent non-state actors (VNSA). The focus is on the question: What factors impact the 
development and use of chemical weapons by VNSAs? The chemical weapon threat posed by 
VNSA groups is enduring and predicated on multiple factors, which can determine the 
effectiveness of such an initiative. By examining these factors and determining which are the 
most relevant, measures can be taken to counter the threat that chemical weapons pose. This 
paper attempts to address these concerns by executing a case study comparison of the chemical 
weapon activities associated with two VNSAs, Aum Shinrikyo and the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS), in order to derive insights related to significant differences and similarities between 
the two organizations. Using the insights from the comparative analysis, recommendations are 
provided to best address the most critical factors associated with VNSA chemical weapon 
efforts. Ultimately, this study determined that an increase in available safe haven or an ability to 






Primary Reader and Advisor: Dr. Sarah Clark 




I owe my sincerest gratitude to my friends, family, colleagues, and professors who motivated me 
to persevere and pursue knowledge and understanding in an increasingly dangerous world. 
Additionally, I could not have done this without my friends Autumn and Levi, who made me a 




Table of Contents 
Abstract………………………………………………………………………..…………ii 
Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………..….iii 
List of Figures………………………………………………………………...…..……...v 
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………...1 
Literature Review………………………………………………..………..……………..2 
Hypothesis and Methods………………………………………………………...……...11 
Data Acquisition: ISIS and Aum Shinrikyo Timeline of VNSA Chemical Weapon 
Factors…………………………………………………………………………………...15 
Data Acquisition: Safe Haven………………………………………………………….17 
Data Acquisition: Technical Experts………………………...………….…………….19 
Data Acquisition: Funding……………………….…………………………………….21 
Data Acquisition: Production Facilities…………………………………………….…23 
Data Acquisition: Leadership Endorsement………………………………….………25 
Data Acquisition: An Ability to Change Approaches to Technology……….………27 
Discussion…………………………………………………………………………….…30 
Comparative Analysis and Findings……………………………………………….….42 















List of Figures 
Figure 1: Technical Complexity and Success Rate………………………………………………8 
Figure 2: Practical Constraint Theory and Strategic Constraint Theory Considerations………..10 
Figure 3: ISIS Revenue 2014-2016………………………………………………………….…..22 
Figure 4: Satyan 7 Sarin Production Facility……………………………………………………24 
Figure 5: Practical Constraint Model and ISIS/Aum Shinrikyo Agent Pursuits………....….…..31 
Figure 6: ISIS Chemical Weapon Attacks in Iraq and Syria…………………………………….36  
Figure 7: Chemical Structure of Nerve Agents………………………………………………….44  




In 1988, the speaker of Iran’s parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani referred to chemical and 
biological weapons as the “poor man’s atomic bomb.” 1 This characterization is identifiable with 
the sentiment that an actor with limited resources could devise a means to achieve a weapon state 
that could be leveraged as a deterrent or to inflict mass casualties. As such, a VNSA that 
possessed several preliminary factors could theoretically achieve a chemical weapon if the 
VNSA had the proper resources, personnel, technology, and strategy. Paul Cornish summarized 
this concept as followed: 
“Although the large-scale production, weaponization and delivery of chemical 
weapons would be challenging, scientifically and logistically, as well as 
extremely expensive, a small number of low-yield chemical weapons would be 
relatively easy to hide and transport and might thus appeal to a well-organized 
and well-funded terrorist group.”2 
VNSAs continue to adapt to counterterrorism pressure and are emboldened to implement 
strategies advantageous to their organizational integrity and survival. Although not every VNSA 
will be able to add chemical weapons to their arsenal, the concern remains that the most 
dangerous amongst these actors could have that ability. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the factors integral to a VNSA chemical weapon effort 
and determine which are the most significant. This paper first considers the broader literature and 
then transitions to discuss the hypothesis and research methods involved. Within these sections 
of the paper, the factors impacting the development and use of chemical weapons by VNSAs will 
be identified. When considering the “effectiveness” or “impact” of VNSA chemical weapon 
                                                          
1 "North Atlantic Assembly AN 255 STC(96) 10 - CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: THE POOR MAN'S BOMB." 
Federation of American Scientists. Last modified October 4, 1996. https://fas.org/irp/threat/an253stc.htm.  
2 Cornish, Paul. "The CBRN System: Assessing the Threat of Terrorist Use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 




factors this will be defined either as a VNSA producing and using a relatively complex chemical 
agent or chemical weapon effort modifications that are conducive for the group’s operational 
success. VNSA chemical agent effort modifications may involve a shift from complex agent 
pursuits to more simplistic efforts. After the literature review and methods section, data will be 
collected and analyzed in accordance with a case study comparison of Aum Shinrikyo and ISIS. 
This paper will then conclude with recommendations as to how readership should deal with the 
VNSA chemical weapon threat. 
Literature Review 
When attempting to characterize the factors impacting the development and use of chemical 
weapons by VNSAs, it is important to understand the drivers associated with these 
unconventional pursuits. Jonathan Tucker stipulated that terrorist organizations tend to be 
conservative in their attack protocols, relying on well-established tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTPs) and innovating only when necessary.3 What’s more, some scholars have 
stipulated that VNSA groups are dissuaded from pursuing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
because of the potential for international reprisal. 4 Nevertheless, one factor that could drive a 
need to innovate are the ideological convictions of VNSA leadership. Gary Ackerman posited 
that these proclivities for some VNSA leaders to pursue WMD efforts, despite the added risks of 
doing so, could be psychological or even fetishistic.5   
 
                                                          
3 Tucker, Jonathan B. “Chapter 14: Lessons from the Case Studies.” In Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of 
Chemical and Biological Weapons, 267. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000.  
4 Forest, James J.F. "Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terrorism." Journal of Strategic Security 5, 
no. 4 (2012): 51-68. Accessed June 21, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26463973  
5 Ackerman, Gary, and Michelle Jacome. "WMD Terrorism: The Once and Future Threat." PRISM, Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 7, no. 3 (2018), 22-36. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26470532. Pg. 24. 
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“End of the World” Rationale 
In some VNSA WMD pursuit’s, apocalyptic millenarianism6 can be a part of a VNSA 
leadership’s decision-making. Some have argued the juxtaposition of apocalyptic motifs and 
WMD as being historically tied to the prevailing threat of nuclear annihilation during the Cold 
War and post-Cold War periods. 7  One of the most agreed upon instances of apocalyptic 
millenarianism is grounded in the Japanese terror group, Aum Shinrikyo, where the group’s 
technical cadre pursued chemical and biological weapon efforts in order to satisfy their leader, 
Shoko Asahara’s, vision of world-ending catastrophes.8 ISIS having developed, weaponized, and 
used of chemical weapons,9 also has been associated with apocalyptic millenarianism.10 
Theoretically, if VNSA leadership is ideologically driven to consider WMD pursuits then 
resources may be allocated accordingly to achieve a WMD end state. However, just because a 
VNSA is ideologically motivated to develop a WMD, does not mean they will be able to achieve 
this outcome.11  Ackerman identifies that VNSAs with members that possess technical expertise, 
financial resources, logistics networks, secure production facilities, and safe haven are more 
likely to produce “higher-end” or advanced chemical warfare agents.12  
                                                          
6 Apocalyptic millenarianism is defined as the “cross-cultural concept grounded in the expectation of a time of 
supernatural peace and abundance on earth” in conjunction with the “end times”. See "Millennialism | Definition, 
History, & Facts." Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed June 6, 2021. 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/millennialism. 
7 Wojcik, Daniel. "Embracing Doomsday: Faith, Fatalism, and Apocalyptic Beliefs in the Nuclear Age." Western 
Folklore 55, no. 4 (1996), 297. doi:10.2307/1500138. Pg. 298. 
8 Ibid. Pg. 325. 
9 Warrick, Joby. "How the Pentagon Got Inside ISIS’ Chemical Weapons Operation—and Ended It." POLITICO. Last 
modified February 27, 2021. https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/02/27/red-line-book-excerpt-
chemical-weapons-syria-471784.  
10 Wood, Graeme. "What ISIS Really Wants." The Atlantic. Last modified February 15, 2015. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/.  
11 Ackerman, Gary, and Michelle Jacome. "WMD Terrorism: The Once and Future Threat." PRISM, Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 7, no. 3 (2018), 22-36. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26470532. Pg. 24. 
12 Ackerman, Gary A. "Anatomizing Chemical and Biological Non-State Adversaries." Calhoun: The NPS Institutional 
Archive, January 2014, 1-355. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36738176.pdf. Pg. 63-64. 
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The Importance of Safe Haven 
Michelle Jacome, Ackerman, and several other scholars in the field of WMD terrorism stipulate 
that safe havens afford VNSAs with the operational flexibility to pursue WMD efforts.13 Jacome 
and Ackerman highlight that establishing safe haven allows VNSAs to engage in innovative 
engineering projects, drawing on historical examples of how the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army developed an indigenous mortar program or how the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) built submarines in Colombia’s jungle.14 What can be inferred is that safe 
haven is an instrumental factor in determining the relative success of a VNSA WMD effort, as it 
establishes a permissible operating environment. 15 Tucker echoes this sentiment by 
communicating: 
“Groups that have developed toxic weapons in the past have typically enjoyed 
a permissive environment that provided time and space for experimentation.”16 
Technical Expertise and Knowledge Types 
A recurring theme and debated topic within the body of scholarly research are the different types 
of technical expertise. Referring back to Tucker’s sentiment in which most VNSAs tend to be 
conservative,17 an argument made in the literature is that most VNSAs will decide not to pursue 
a WMD effort because of its complex or non-conservative characteristics. A significant hurdle 
that a VNSA faces is the steep learning curve associated with developing advanced agent 
                                                          
13 Ackerman, Gary, and Michelle Jacome. "WMD Terrorism: The Once and Future Threat." PRISM, Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 7, no. 3 (2018), 22-36. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26470532. Pg. 32. 
14 Ibid. Pg. 32. 
15 Ibid. Pg. 32. 
16 Tucker, Jonathan B. "The Future of Chemical Weapons." The New Atlantis. Last modified September 26, 2020. 
https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-future-of-chemical-weapons.  
17 Tucker, Jonathan B. “Chapter 14: Lessons from the Case Studies.” In Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of 
Chemical and Biological Weapons, 267. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000.  
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pursuits.18 This is where the body of literature asserts that individuals selected to aid in a VNSA 
chemical weapon effort, as a requisite, should possess a significant degree of tacit and explicit 
technical knowledge.19 Explicit knowledge is information that is readily accessible, easily 
understood, and transferrable; whereas tacit knowledge is more elusive as it tends to rely on a 
“hands on” understanding in a relevant field, making it harder to codify and difficult to 
transfer.20 Where some scholars differ in their analysis on this issue is whether tacit knowledge is 
a requisite for a VNSA WMD effort. According to the Federation of American Scientists: 
“The production of the nerve agents requires significantly more sophisticated 
chemical processing…If nerve agent production is technologically infeasible 
for a proliferant, a simpler agent (vesicant or classic agent) can be produced.”21 
In effect, depending on resources and the types of technical expertise within the respective safe 
haven, a VNSA might consider a multitude of chemical agents of varying complexity. When 
considering the availability of these knowledge types, some VNSAs may use the internet for 
accessing open-source information on explicit knowledge sources.22 Separately, VNSAs have 
also recruited professionally-trained chemists and engaged with consultants outside of the group 
in order to obtain the tacit knowledge required to achieve a chemical weapon status.23 
 
                                                          
18 Ackerman, Gary, and Jeremy Tamsett. "Islamist Use and Pursuit of CBRN Terrorism." In Jihadists and Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, 339-340. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2009. 
19 Ibid. Pg. 339-340. 
20 Jackson, Brian A., Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from 
Private Sector Technology Adoption. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1248.html. Pg. 8-9. 
21 "Federation of American Scientists: Chemical Weapons Production and Storage." Federation Of American 
Scientists – Science for a Safer, More Informed World. Last modified September 9, 2013. 
https://fas.org/programs/bio/chemweapons/production.html.  
22 "The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes." United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Last modified 2012. 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf.  
23 Ackerman, Gary A.. "Comparative Analysis of VNSA Complex Engineering Efforts." Journal of Strategic Security9, 
no. 1 (2016) : 119-133. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1511  
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Technology, Innovation, and Theory Considerations 
Another series of scholarly work resides with assessing the future of WMD terrorism, which is 
identifiable, in part, with an ability to change approaches to technology. Gregory Koblentz and 
Ackerman posit that five-emerging technology concerns draw special consideration for chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and how CBRN and these emerging 
technologies might be integrated and leveraged by VNSAs.24 25 The emerging technologies 
include drones, the Dark Web, malware, synthetic biology, and additive manufacturing. 26 27 
Koblentz and Ackerman identify with a narrative that places an emphasis on technologies that 
“de-skill” or make WMD efforts easier by removing tacit knowledge requirements. 
The potential amalgamation of emerging technology and CBRN speaks to the ability for VNSAs 
to adopt innovative approaches in overcoming what used to be hurdles in chemical 
weaponization efforts. For example, the combined use of drones and chemical weapons, could 
provide the VNSA with an efficient means to deliver a chemical agent. According to Major 
Steven Hummel: 
 “In sum, the applicability to chemical weapons development of the 
technologies examined by this report lies primarily in unmanned aerial systems 
(UAS) use as a delivery mechanism. Chemical weapons material is relatively 
accessible, at least compared to biological weapons and nuclear material, so 
the critical hurdle in this category is effective delivery and dispersion… Given 
both the increasing advances in UAS capability and the innovative approach to 
                                                          
24 Koblentz, Gregory D. "Emerging Technologies and the Future of CBRN Terrorism." The Washington Quarterly 43, 
no. 2 (2020), 177-196. doi:10.1080/0163660x.2020.1770969. Pg. 178-184. 
25 Ackerman, Gary, and Michelle Jacome. "WMD Terrorism: The Once and Future Threat." PRISM, Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 7, no. 3 (2018), 22-36. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26470532. Pg. 31. 
26 Koblentz, Gregory D. "Emerging Technologies and the Future of CBRN Terrorism." The Washington Quarterly 43, 
no. 2 (2020), 177-196. doi:10.1080/0163660x.2020.1770969. Pg. 178-184. 
27 Ackerman, Gary, and Michelle Jacome. "WMD Terrorism: The Once and Future Threat." PRISM, Countering 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 7, no. 3 (2018), 22-36. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26470532. Pg. 31. 
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attack methodology and weapons development non-state actors have shown, 
this threat seems likely to grow”28 
In effect, when we consider how emerging technology is growing to potentially encompass 
VNSA chemical weapon pursuits, this in part addresses Tucker’s consideration whereby a 
VNSA could see a need to innovate29 at least in the sense of chemical weapon delivery systems, 
especially as we continue to observe how drones are becoming more prominent and established 
within VNSA groups. 30  
When considering a theoretical framework for VNSA WMD pursuits, James Forest, encapsulates 
the breadth of VNSA WMD factors within the confines of his practical and strategic constraint 
theories. 31 These theories take into account VNSA WMD factors but also attempt to discuss why 
most VNSAs decide not pursue WMD or chemical weapon efforts. Practical constraint theory 
can be broken down into technical and environmental considerations, where the complexity of 
the WMD pursuit is inversely correlated to the success of the attack.32 Within the technical 
considerations category we can align this with technical expertise. Environmental considerations 
are identifiable with safe haven, funding, access to production facilities, and an ability to change 
approaches to technology. According to Forest, an increase in the complexity of a WMD effort, 
combined with higher financial costs and the number of required technical experts becomes an 
                                                          
28 Hummel, Stephen. "Small Groups, Big Weapons: The Nexus of Emerging Technologies and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Terrorism." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Last modified April 2, 2020. 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/small-groups-big-weapons-the-nexus-of-emerging-technologies-and-weapons-of-
mass-destruction-terrorism/.  
29 Tucker, Jonathan B. “Chapter 14: Lessons from the Case Studies.” In Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of 
Chemical and Biological Weapons, 267. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000. 
30 Warrick, Joby. "Use of weaponized drones by ISIS spurs terrorism fears." The Washington Post. Last modified 
February 21, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/use-of-weaponized-drones-by-isis-
spurs-terrorism-fears/2017/02/21/9d83d51e-f382-11e6-8d72-263470bf0401_story.html.  
31 Forest, James J.F. "Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terrorism." Journal of Strategic Security 
5, no. 4 (2012): 51-68. Accessed June 21, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26463973  
32 Ibid. Pg. 54-55. 
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increasing cause for concern for a VNSA group.33 The rationale for this resides with an increased 
risk for operational failure or a misallocation of resources: 
“Overall, there are many kinds of technical challenges associated with CBRN 
weapons. These challenges, in turn, influence a terrorist group's decision-
making about whether to invest resources in trying to develop or acquire them 
for use.” 34 
 Figure 1 illustrates Forest’s practical constraint theory:35 
 
Figure 1: Technical Complexity and Success Rate36 
The upper left portion of this scale where the complexity of the weapon is high and the 
probability of success is low can be identifiable with a relatively sophisticated or advanced 
WMD pursuit. Conversely, the lower right portion of the scale where the complexity of the 
weapon is lower but the success rate is higher might be attributable to relatively crude WMD 
efforts.  
Forest’s strategic constraint theory considers the VNSA WMD factor associated with leadership 
endorsement. Forest stipulates that VNSA groups tend to be rational in their decision-making 
                                                          
33 Forest, James J.F. "Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terrorism." Journal of Strategic Security 
5, no. 4 (2012): 54-55. Accessed June 21, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26463973 
34 Ibid. Pg. 56. 
35 Ibid. Pg. 55. 
36 Ibid. Pg. 55. 
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capacity, and when taking into account practical constraints will at times consider whether WMD 
or chemical weapon efforts are worth pursuing: 
“For example, a terrorist group's leaders may ask themselves, ‘Will a CBRN 
weapon help us achieve our objectives faster or more effectively than other 
means? Will the possession or use of such a weapon bring us a considerable 
amount of prestige and/or power to intimidate our enemies?’ For most terrorist 
groups, their strategic deliberations have steered them away from CBRN 
weapons.”37 
Decision-making also takes into account how WMD or chemical weapon pursuits might not help 
achieve political objectives because of the prospect of damaging what Forest refers to as the 
“space and people they seek to influence and govern.”38 However, Forest also alludes to the idea 
that ideological considerations of an “us versus them” mentality for some VNSAs could expand 
weapon pursuits to include chemical weapon efforts. 39 
When we consider how practical constraint theory and strategic constraint theory come together, 
Forest identifies that most VNSAs face high practical constraints and high strategic constraints; 
i.e., they do not have the factors necessary for a WMD or chemical weapon pursuit. 40 There are 
also instances where a group might have fewer practical constraints but more strategic 
constraints or vice versa. For instance, a group could have factors such as technical experts, 
funding, safe haven, and production facilities but leadership is not willing to endorse WMD or 
chemical weapon efforts. 41  Lastly, there are those rare instances where a VNSA might have low 
                                                          
37 Forest, James J.F. "Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terrorism." Journal of Strategic Security 
5, no. 4 (2012): 57. Accessed June 21, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26463973  
38 Ibid. Pg. 58. 
39 Ibid. Pg. 58. 
40 Ibid. Pg. 60-61. 
41 Ibid. Pg. 60-61. 
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practical and strategic constraints, meaning the group could have all factors necessary to pursue a 
WMD or chemical weapon effort. 42   
The following figure illustrates both practical constraint theory and strategic constraint theory 
considerations: 
 
Figure 2: Practical Constraint Theory and Strategic Constraint Theory Considerations43 
Way Forward 
This paper aims to expand on the body of scholarly works addressing VNSA chemical weapon 
efforts by not only concentrating on a historical case of VNSA chemical weapon use but also to 
see where key distinctions lie with more contemporary examples. Having considered the range of 
scholarly research, an argument can be made that the factors that impact the development and 
use of chemical weapons by VNSAs are securing safe haven, having technical experts, proper 
finances, access to production facilities, leadership endorsement, and an ability to change 
                                                          
42 Forest, James J.F. "Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terrorism." Journal of Strategic Security 
5, no. 4 (2012): 60-61. Accessed June 21, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26463973 
43 Ibid. Pg. 60-61. 
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approaches to technology – with the most critical factors being safe haven and an ability to 
change approaches to technology.  
For the purpose of this study, safe haven will be defined as followed:  
“Terrorist safe havens described in this report include ungoverned, under-
governed, or ill‑governed physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, 
plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative 
security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.”44  
Our definition for “an ability to change approaches to technology” can be highlighted as 
“knowledge applied for a practical purpose in order to affect and control the user’s 
environment”45 and often involves “material objects, as well as systems, processes and 
techniques, but is always purposive.”46 Other factors are self-explanatory and do not require 
explicit definitions. These attributes will be placed into greater context later in the paper. 
Hypothesis and Methods 
This paper has examined some of the existing literature related to VNSA pursuits and the factors 
involved in determining the effectiveness of a chemical weapon effort. As such, this paper asks 
the following research question: What factors impact the development and use of chemical 
weapons by VNSAs? The hypothesis for this study is that an increase in available safe haven or 
an ability to change approaches to technology makes a VNSA chemical weapon effort more 
likely.  
                                                          
44 "Country Reports on Terrorism 2019." United States Department of State. Last modified June 24, 2020. 
https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/.  
45 Gary A. Ackerman, "'More Bang for the Buck': Examining the Determinants of Terrorist Adoption of New 
Weapons Technologies" (Ph.D. Dissertation: King's College London, 2014), pp. 19. 
46 Ibid. Pg. 19. 
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In order to test this claim, a comparative case study will be conducted by examining the actions 
taken by Aum Shinrikyo and ISIS. By comparing two significant VNSAs who have both 
demonstrated chemical weapon efforts, insight will be gleaned by examining each of these 
factors respective to these groups. An important consideration when conducting this research 
study was to understand that a conventional VNSA engineering effort could also align with the 
factors that we’ve established. For example, as previously identified the FARC constructed 
“Narco-subs” using the Columbian jungle as a safe haven but never considered chemical 
weapons. 47 Although VNSAs may share common factors, such as safe haven, while pursuing 
different innovative projects (i.e. conventional v. chemical weapon efforts), the deciding factor 
between projects often resides with leadership intentions and the general motives associated with 
the VNSA.48 Additionally, there may be confluence in other factors that could be indicative of a 
VNSA chemical weapon effort, instead of a conventional one. For example, the VNSA could 
attempt to acquire chemical weapon precursors while simultaneously recruiting professional 
chemists. We will expound on this facet of differentiating between conventional and chemical 
weapon efforts later in the paper. 
The following chart will be referenced throughout the study for assessing the VNSA group and 
chemical weapon factors. 
Factors Aum Shinrikyo ISIS 




Possessed Funding   
Possessed Access to 
Production Facilities 
  
                                                          
47 Gary A. Ackerman, "'More Bang for the Buck': Examining the Determinants of Terrorist Adoption of New 
Weapons Technologies" (Ph.D. Dissertation: King's College London, 2014), pp. 32. 
48 Ackerman, Gary A. "Comparative Analysis of VNSA Complex Engineering Efforts." Journal of Strategic Security9, 






Possessed an Ability to 




The independent variables will be the factors associated with the VNSA chemical weapon effort.  
The dependent variables will be the acquisition of chemical weapons by the VNSA. The reason 
why Aum Shinrikyo and ISIS have been selected is because these groups appear to be the most 
“successful” in the demonstrated production and use of chemical weapons. This “success” can be 
qualified by Aum Shinrikyo being able to produce “significant quantities of sarin” and ISIS 
using chlorine and sulfur mustard dozens of times on the battlefield in Iraq and Syria. 49 Other 
groups by comparison have not been able to achieve either this scale of agent complexity or 
large-scale use. The justification for excluding a group like al Qaeda from this study was because 
cursory research identified that al Qaeda leadership deemed chemical weaponization efforts 
inappropriate. According to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen: 
“The evidence of al Qaeda’s efforts to acquire WMD for over a decade 
overwhelmingly suggests that the senior leadership’s intent is focused on 
developing high end WMD, not chemical weapons or “dirty bombs” that lack 
the game changing qualities of nuclear or biological weapons. In this context, a 
possible explanation of Zawahiri’s puzzling cancellation of a small-scale 
chemical attack on the New York City subway in 2003 is that it simply wasn’t 
worth doing.”50 
Additionally, it can be argued that Aum Shinrikyo is the quintessential “baseline” from which to 
compare other VNSA chemical weapon efforts because the group was able to successfully 
                                                          
49 Hummel, Stephen. "Small Groups, Big Weapons: The Nexus of Emerging Technologies and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Terrorism." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Last modified April 2, 2020. 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/small-groups-big-weapons-the-nexus-of-emerging-technologies-and-weapons-of-
mass-destruction-terrorism/.  
50 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification For and Against Nuclear Bombs 
(Massachusetts: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2011), Pg. 20. 
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develop and use the nerve agent sarin – a moderately difficult chemical agent to produce. Upon 
successfully collecting data pertaining to these VNSAs and the factors associated with their 
chemical weapon efforts, a discussion component will be initiated to highlight important 
distinctions between the VNSA and their respective chemical weapon effort factors. This study 
will not employ quantitative methods because it would be difficult to collect measurable 
attributes associated with the factors. For example, attempting to find quantitative data when 
considering leadership endorsement. In terms of trying to determine if the hypothesis is correct, a 
comparative case study will be conducted against ISIS and Aum Shinrikyo, whereby a 
determination will be made as to whether each factor was represented or impactful to the 
respective chemical weapon efforts. These variables will be operationalized with a designator of 
“no,” “somewhat,” and “yes.” The expectation is that safe haven and an ability to change 
approaches to technology will be the most critical factors. When determining how critical a 
factor is some of these attributes are foundational or allow other factors to become realized. For 
example, once a VNSA secures safe haven, they may be able to build chemical weapon 
production facilities, recruit technical experts, or fund operations because of the perceived 
permissible operating environment. Another expectation is how some of these factors will be 
“necessary” or “sufficient” depending on the chemical weapon effort itself. For example, in the 
pursuit of an advanced agent, such as sarin, all VNSA chemical weapon factors could be 
characterized as “necessary”. However, in the pursuit of a simpler agent, such as chlorine or 
hydrogen sulfide, there may be a shift from “necessary” to “sufficient”, where there might not be 
as much of a need for safe haven, production facilities, or technical experts. The evidence 
gathered to evaluate these claims will be from scholarly articles, narratives from select personnel 
associated with the group’s chemical weapon efforts, news publications, and public statements 
15 
 
made by these organizations. This paper will conclude with a comparative analysis and 
suggestions as to how to improve counterproliferation and counter-WMD efforts.  
Data Acquisition: ISIS and Aum Shinrikyo Timeline of VNSA Chemical Weapon Factors 
The following timeline provides a summary of key events for ISIS and Aum Shinrikyo’s 
chemical weapon efforts. Later data acquisition sections will provide additional context as to 
how these events relate to the VNSA chemical weapon factors: 
Aum Shinrikyo ISIS 
Mid-1980s to Early 1990s: Establishment of “Lotus 
Villages”, the purchase of 14 acres in Namino, and 
communes built at Fujinomiya, near Mount Fuji. (Safe 
Haven) 51 
1999: Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi, the leader of al Qaeda 
in Iraq (AQI), established training camps in 
Afghanistan and experimented with toxins and 
poisons.52  By 2006, these chemical weapon efforts 
would become more sophisticated. (Leadership 
Endorsement/Safe Haven) 53 
1985 to 1989: Shoko Asahara shifts from peace and 
enlightenment to apocalyptic millenarianism motifs as 
central premise. (Leadership Endorsement) 54 
2005: ISIS technical expert, Abu Malik, long time 
Salafi jihadist allegedly involved in ISIS’s planning 
efforts to produce chemical weapons.55 Abu Malik 
associated with Saddam Regime chemical weapon 
efforts. (Technical Experts)56 
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1993: Group reaches inflection point; experts set up 
bench scale laboratory and succeed in producing gram 
quantities of sarin.57 (Technical Experts) 
2011 to 2014: Seize territory in Syria and Iraq. (Safe 
Haven) 58 
1993: Production facility Satyan 7 established. 
(Production Facilities) 59 
2015: Abu Malik dies. (Technical Experts) 60 
1993: Discussion held to equip forces with plasma and 
X-Ray weapons. (An Ability to Change Approaches to 
Technology)61 
2014 to 2017: At the height of ISIS’s chemical weapon 
use62 its revenue is estimated (in $million) to be 970-
1890 in 2014, 1035-1700 in 2015, 520-870 in 2016. 
(Funding) 63 
Early-1990s: At height, group’s financial assets reach 
as much as 2 billion USD. (Funding)64 
2014 to 2017: Unspecified number of production sites 
exist. (Production Facilities) 65 
March 1995: Tokyo subway sarin attack. 66 2014 to 2017: Chemical weapon attacks conducted in 
Iraq and Syria. 67 
                                                          
57 Sageman, Marc and Terrance Leighton, Lloyd Hough, Hidemi Yuki, Rui Kotani and Zachary M. Hosfor, “Aum 
Shinrikyo Insights into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons,” Centers for a New American 
Security, July 2011: Pg. 21. 
58 "The War Against ‘Islamic State’ in Maps and Charts." BBC News. Last modified March 28, 2018. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034.  
59 Sageman, Marc and Terrance Leighton, Lloyd Hough, Hidemi Yuki, Rui Kotani and Zachary M. Hosfor, “Aum 
Shinrikyo Insights into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons,” Centers for a New American 
Security, July 2011: Pg. 27. 
60 Warrick, Joby. "How the Pentagon Got Inside ISIS’ Chemical Weapons Operation—and Ended It." POLITICO. Last 
modified February 27, 2021. https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/02/27/red-line-book-excerpt-
chemical-weapons-syria-471784.  
61 Sageman, Marc and Terrance Leighton, Lloyd Hough, Hidemi Yuki, Rui Kotani and Zachary M. Hosfor, “Aum 
Shinrikyo Insights into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons,” Centers for a New American 
Security, July 2011: Pg. 20. 
62 Strack, Columb. "The Evolution of the Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Efforts – Combating Terrorism Center at 
West Point." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Last modified January 12, 2018. 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/the-evolution-of-the-islamic-states-chemical-weapons-efforts/.  
63 Heibner, Stefan, Peter Neumann, John Holland-McCowan, and Rajan Basra. "Caliphate in Decline: An Estimate of 
Islamic State’s Financial Fortunes." The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 
2017, 1-20. 
64 "THE TRANSNATIONAL THREAT." Federation Of American Scientists – Science for a Safer, More Informed World. 
Accessed June 16, 2021. https://fas.org/irp/threat/prolif97/trans.html.  
65 Strack, Columb. "The Evolution of the Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Efforts – Combating Terrorism Center at 
West Point." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Last modified January 12, 2018. 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/the-evolution-of-the-islamic-states-chemical-weapons-efforts/.  
66 Sageman, Marc and Terrance Leighton, Lloyd Hough, Hidemi Yuki, Rui Kotani and Zachary M. Hosfor, “Aum 
Shinrikyo Insights into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons,” Centers for a New American 
Security, July 2011: Pg. 19. 
67 Strack, Columb. "The Evolution of the Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Efforts – Combating Terrorism Center at 




 2017: Australian ISIS bomb plot; secondary plot 
reveals plans of a toxic gas attack against public transit. 
(An Ability to Change Approaches to Technology)68 
 Late 2017: ISIS loses nearly all territorial claims in 
Iraq and Syria.69 
 January 2020: ISIS Spokesman publicly endorses 
chemical weapon attacks. (Leadership Endorsement) 70 
Data Acquisition: Safe Haven 
In the mid-1980’s, the leader of Aum Shinrikyo, Shoko Asahara, established communes known 
as “Lotus Villages” which would form the basis of his group’s perceived utopic society.71 As the 
group gained more followers, the number of communes or safe haven increased accordingly.72 
By 1989, Asahara’s group undertook instrumental measures to insulate itself from state 
interference and reinforce their safe havens by appealing to the Tokyo Prefecture under the 
auspices of the Religious Corporations Law. 73 Upon being approved as a legal religious body, 
Aum Shinrikyo by mid-1990 would further increase property acquisitions for the purpose of 
producing chemical weapons. According to the Centers for a New American Security: 
“The rapid expansion of Aum required more communal facilities. Therefore, in 
May 1990, Hayakawa, using dummy companies, bought 14 acres in 
Namino…Unknown to the police, local residents or even most Aum members, 
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the cult’s desire for land and buildings reflected Asahara’s desire to 
manufacture chemical weapons.” 74 
Between 2011 and 2014, ISIS engaged in a multipronged strategy that saw the group join in the 
conflict against the Syrian regime, take advantage of the US troop withdrawal, stoke sectarian 
violence, and begin seizing territory in Syria and Iraq.75 As the group began seizing territory, 
they were effectively able to operate permissibly, providing the group with sufficient time and 
space to pursue a number of civil and military projects. 76  
With territorial claims established by 2014, some of the group’s military projects included 
chlorine and sulfur mustard use.77 Joby Warrick provided insight on this subject and identified 
what a permissible operating environment or safe haven allowed ISIS to pursue: 
“Obtaining chlorine was no problem, as the industrial chemical could be found 
in Iraqi factories the terrorists now controlled. But what about sulfur mustard? 
The lab tests and interviews yielded a confirmation, and also a surprise. The 
oily liquid in the mortar shells was sulfur mustard, no doubt, but it differed 
from the kinds of military-grade blister agents the OPCW’s experts were 
familiar with. Its formula was relatively simple, even crude.”78 
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Data Acquisition: Technical Experts 
After a series of failed biological weapon pursuits, Aum Shinrikyo then decided to pursue a 
chemical weapon effort.79 Under the supervision of Hideo Murai, sarin was deemed the most 
optimal agent because of its relative cost effectiveness.80 Although Murai was in charge of the 
initiative, as Aum Shinrikyo’s Minister of Science and Technology, 81 the individual who had 
made the suggestion to Murai to pursue a sarin weaponization effort was Masami Tsuchiya, an 
organic chemist.82 By mid-1993, Tsuchiya reached an inflection point for the group, by setting 
up a bench scale laboratory and succeeded in producing gram quantities of sarin.83  
As of early 2021, it was confirmed ISIS had produced significant quantities of sulfur mustard 
while holding territory in Iraq and Syria. 84 The technical expert most likely responsible for 
helping ISIS get a chemical weapon effort started was Salih Jasim Mohammed Falah al-Sabawi, 
also known as Abu Malik.85 Abu Malik, a long time Salafi jihadist had ties to ISIS going back to 
2005 when the group operated under the auspices of AQI and had allegedly been involved in 
AQI’s planning efforts to produce chemical weapons.86 Abu Malik has also been reported to 
have “worked at Saddam Hussein’s Muthanna chemical weapon production facility before 
affiliating with al Qaeda in Iraq in 2005,” according to a US Central Command press release 
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statement.87 The Muthanna chemical weapon production facility was a key compound for 
developing offensive agents, including sarin and mustard gas.88 However, most resourcing at this 
production site was allocated primarily to the production of sulfur mustard.89 Therefore, it may 
be inferred that Abu Malik played an instrumental role in helping ISIS to develop their own 
indigenous means of producing sulfur mustard. 
Abu Malik was supported by a number of technical experts, including Suleiman al-Afari, which 
allowed ISIS to continue to pose a chemical weapon threat following Abu Malik’s death in 2015. 
90 As revealed in Joby Warrick’s exposé on the group’s chemical weapon effort: 
“The CIA and the Defense Department were now working to disrupt the 
Islamic State’s weapons program, and they already had achieved a crucial 
success: the killing of Abu Malik, Afari’s ISIS boss. Alarmed by the 
engineer’s talk about gassing Western cities, the Pentagon quietly dispatched 
special-forces teams into Iraq to find him, and then ordered an airstrike that 
obliterated his Mosul office. Abu Malik was dead, but as Afari’s confessions 
revealed, ISIS had not given up. Newcomers, including foreign scientists, had 
been tapped to fulfill Abu Malik’s terrible vision.” 91 
Suleiman al-Afari was a geologist who was previously employed with Iraq’s Ministry of 
Industry and Minerals. 92 Afari was assigned to ISIS’s metallurgical division, where he acquired 
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stainless steel tanks and corrosive and heat resistant piping.93 Afari revealed that these 
acquisitions were necessary because of the caustic characteristics associated with the crude sulfur 
mustard agent the group had been producing.94 
Data Acquisition: Funding 
According to the Center for a New American Security, early periods of Aum Shinrikyo obligated 
new entrants into the organization to give donations and renounce materialism: 
“Novices were urged to give donations for initiation and gradually to renounce 
the materialist and spiritually void society (symbolized by the United States) 
that was inevitably heading toward catastrophe.”95 
After having established safe haven, Aum Shinrikyo was able to gain exposure to several 
industries and businesses via its member’s holdings.96 Some of these existing industries were in 
the fields of software development, imports/exports, mining, and chemicals; some of which were 
complicit in the development of Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin effort.97 Additionally, some of these 
firms were used as shell companies when the group increased sarin production capacity: 
“To purchase the required technical equipment and substantial amounts of 
chemicals, Aum created two dummy companies – both run by Niimi – under 
Hasegawa Chemical, an already existing Aum shell company.”98 
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According to the Federation of American Scientists, Aum Shinrikyo at its height in the early 
1990s had accrued assets worth an estimated $2 billion.99 
At the height of ISIS’s territorial control and chemical weapon use between 2014 and 2017,100 its 
revenue was broken down as followed: taxes, natural resources, kidnapping, antiquities, foreign 
donations, and looting.101 The following chart published by the International Centre for the 
Study of Radicalization and Political Violence provides greater fidelity in terms of how ISIS was 
financed during this period:102 
 
Figure 3: ISIS Revenue 2014-2016103 
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Data Acquisition: Production Facilities  
By 1993, Aum Shinrikyo decided there was a need for a dedicated large-scale production facility 
for sarin manufacturing–identified as Satyan 7. 104 This need was attributed to the quantity of 
agent requested, where bench or small-scale production efforts would not suffice. 105  It is 
important to note that Aum’s technical experts displayed hesitation when going from small to 
industrial scale, noting the increase in difficulty. 106 As a side note, this attempt to increase sarin 
production capacity aligns with practical constraint theory’s environmental considerations: 107 
“After Tsuchiya’s successful production of small quantities of sarin, Murai 
ordered Tsuchiya to make about 70 tons of the chemical. Tsuchiya says he 
responded that he was reluctant to produce such a large amount. Under any 
conditions, there was a practical difficulty. Tsuchiya was a research scientist; 
large batches would require constructing and administering a production 
facility, not just a research lab.”108 
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Figure 4: Satyan 7 Sarin Production Facility109 
By comparison, as ISIS began acquiring territory in Iraq and Syria in 2014 110 it can be inferred 
that numerous production sites existed. 111 Insufficient data exists detailing the number of ISIS 
sulfur mustard production sites; however, press releases have sporadically identified their 
existence: 
“In an effort to blunt the Islamic State’s ability to make the weapons, the 
American-led air campaign has bombed militants associated with overseeing 
their production and the facilities where chemical ordnance is manufactured. In 
September, for instance, allied warplanes attacked a converted pharmaceutical 
factory in northern Iraq thought to have been a chemical weapons production 
facility.”112 
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Separately, smaller scale ISIS production efforts probably took place at Mosul University for the 
purpose of R&D, which was within their territorial control or deemed safe haven at the time. 
According to the UN Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by 
Da’esh: 
“Islamic State leaders recruited scientists and engineers — a mix of foreign 
experts and veterans of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s chemical 
weapons factories — to help them produce sulfur mustard, using the 
laboratories of Mosul University as a research hub.” 113 
Data Acquisition: Leadership Endorsement 
Shoko Asahara, under the auspices of helping his followers achieve spiritual enlightenment 
initially began the organization with peace as an overarching objective. 114 Asahara’s charismatic 
personality would captivate a number of individuals, many of whom were students gifted in the 
fields of chemistry, physics, and biology.115 From 1985 to 1989, Asahara would shift from peace 
and enlightenment to delusions of grandeur, asserting he was a hero or God responsible for 
saving humanity by tapping into apocalyptic millenarianism motifs as the central premise.116 The 
tipping point for Asahara and Aum Shinrikyo that would eventually drive it to pursue chemical 
weapon efforts would manifest in an electoral race117. According to the Centers for a New 
American Security: 
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“Asahara reasoned that if he failed to gain control of the state through 
elections, then this was again a sign of God, and he would go ahead with his 
plan of destruction.” 118 
Having failed to gain any form of state control, Asahara and Aum Shinrikyo would follow 
through with efforts to enact the “plan of destruction” that was prophesized by Asahara. 119 
In the case of ISIS, there is a significant history of chemical weapon intent but direct leadership 
endorsement is tenuous. In 1999, Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi, the leader of the predecessor 
organization to ISIS, al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), established training camps in Afghanistan and 
began experimenting with toxins and poisons.120 By 2006, these chemical weapon efforts would 
become more sophisticated, employing a combination of vehicle-borne improvised explosive 
devices and chlorine.121 By 2013, further progress was made with an alleged combined use of 
remote-controlled helicopters and unspecified chemical agents, just a couple years shy of a 
sustained ISIS campaign of chemical weapon use in Iraq and Syria.122  
Although ISIS chemical weapon experts and supporter elements are identified, there is a gap in 
the evidence directly linking ISIS leadership with endorsing the use of chemical weapons. The 
closest observance of leadership endorsement is from the ISIS spokesperson in January 2020.123 
According to press reporting on this topic, he stated: 
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“O soldiers of the caliphate everywhere below you are the settlements and 
markets of the Jews. So, make them a testing ground for your weapons: our 
chemical-bearing rockets.” 124 
 
Data Acquisition: An Ability to Change Approaches to Technology 
As previously stated, “an ability to change approaches to technology” is defined as “knowledge 
applied for a practical purpose in order to affect and control the user’s environment”125 and often 
involves “material objects, as well as systems, processes and techniques, but is always 
purposive.”126 
For Aum Shinrikyo, despite having a number of technically competent individuals, not all of the 
projects were practical nor purposive. Furthermore, the systems and processes in place for the 
group would result in the eventual dissolution of the organization. Namely, many of the cult’s 
leaders and associates were arrested following the attack on the Tokyo subway,127 with no 
contingency planning, processes, or techniques to follow through on. To the point of 
impracticality, according to the Centers for a New American Security:  
“Projects included creating an astral teleporter (an electronic device to clean 
one’s “astral dimension”) and the “Perfect Salvation Initiation” headgear 
(designed to transmit Asahara’s brainwaves to his disciples and replace their 
own impure brain waves) … They talked about futuristic technologies of 
destruction, such as plasma weapons that could atomize human bodies, mirrors 
several miles across that would float in space reflecting the sun’s rays so that 
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they destroyed all life in the process, vast laser guns and other imagined means 
of destruction.”128  
In contrast, ISIS’s ability to change approaches to technology appears to be one build on 
contingency planning and practicality. This can be exemplified in their agent of choice: sulfur 
mustard. Given the group had seized territory; it can be argued that the selection of sulfur 
mustard was used in a capacity to deny troop advancement and to maintain an area of control.129 
Evidence of employing sulfur mustard as an area denial weapon was made apparent during 
World War I with Germany’s use of the agent against the Allies near Ypres, Belgium in July 
1917.130 
Additionally, according to press reporting from ISIS technical experts, measures may have been 
taken to ensure research data was preserved: 
“Moreover, the knowledge and skills acquired from Afari and other veterans of 
the program undoubtedly still exist, tucked away in computer files, flash drives 
and in the memories of the surviving participants who scattered as the group’s 
self-proclaimed caliphate collapsed, Western officials and terrorism experts 
said.”131 
Despite the eventual collapse of ISIS’s territory and the dispersal of surviving members, steps 
had been taken to archive processes and knowledge. Additionally, it is important to note the 
group has reverted to an insurgency, but now also has the added benefit of having that technical 
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knowledge at their disposal. Shiraz Maher identifies that “this is a group that emerged from 
being an insurgency into a proto-state, and it’s now simply pulling back to what it knows 
best.”132 
Most importantly, ISIS took measures to continue chemical weapon initiatives by not only 
reducing the level of tacit knowledge required but also being able to transmit that information to 
its global enterprise. This was exemplified in a 2017 Australian ISIS bomb plot whereby a 
secondary plot revealed plans of a toxic gas attack against public transit.133 The toxic gas was 
identified to be hydrogen sulfide, an inherently easy toxic gas to produce with far less precursor 
materials required when compared to sulfur mustard.134 Despite ISIS’s territorial degradation by 
2017, Iraq and Syria-based ISIS attack plotters (Tarek Khayat and Basil Hassan) essentially were 
able to directly support the Australia-based ISIS members (Khaled Khayat and Mahmoud 
Khayat) by providing technical support via encrypted communication platforms, such as 
Telegram.135 According to Andrew Zammit, at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point: 
“Although the plotters’ priority was to prepare the bomb to destroy an 
international airliner, they worked on multiple attack plans at the same time, 
demonstrating the plot’s ambitions. The second plan was the chemical weapon 
attack. On May 6, 2017, Khaled was sent instructions on how to create a 
chemical compound that could be dispersed as a lethal gas…Khaled began by 
gathering the precursor chemicals and again kept Tarek Khayat and Basil 
Hassan updated on his progress by sending photos. On May 21, 2017, either 
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Tarek or Hassan via Telegram sent Khaled a video showing how to turn the 
chemical compound, which they had not yet created, into a poisonous gas.” 136 
It is unlikely the Australia-based ISIS members could have come up with this conventional and 
unconventional attack plot as Zammit’s report credits these innovative approaches to Basil 
Hassan and Tarek Khayat.137 
Discussion 
Having provided a holistic account of the chemical weapon factors associated with Aum 
Shinrikyo and ISIS, an important initial discussion point is to address how these circumstances 
align with one of Forest’s rare instances where VNSAs had low practical and strategic 
constraints. 138  As previously identified practical constraint theory can be broken down into 
technical and environmental considerations, and include the following factors: technical 
expertise, safe haven, funding, access to production facilities, and an ability to change 
approaches to technology.139 Strategic constraint theory, considers the VNSA WMD factor 
associated with leadership endorsement. Referring back to Figure 1, let’s consider how our 
VNSA chemical weapon efforts align with weapon complexity and the likelihood of success. In 
this case, sarin would align with the upper left portion of this model whereas sulfur mustard, 
chlorine, and hydrogen sulfide weaponization pursuits would align with the middle to lower right 
portions of the model. 
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Figure 5: Practical Constraint Model and ISIS/Aum Shinrikyo Agent Pursuits140 
What can be inferred is that ISIS appeared to have more success relative to Aum Shinrikyo. 
Although both groups had secured safe haven, recruited technical experts, amassed funding, 
constructed production facilities, and received leadership endorsement, where these groups 
deviated was in their ability to change approaches to technology.  
Safe haven for both Aum Shinrikyo and ISIS served as integral launching points to obtain 
operational flexibility, albeit in different ways. Aum Shinrikyo’s approach of effectively 
circumventing state governance and law enforcement by using legislative proceedings to identify 
as a religious body allowed the group to ascertain significant land holdings that would not be 
privy to local security forces. 141 Conversely, ISIS would forcibly seize territory and for a time 
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would become the authority in that region, allowing them to operate permissibly. 142 If a VNSA 
does not have a permissible operating space or safe haven then their activities are effectively 
limited, to include chemical weaponization efforts. The reason why a territorial hold is important 
is that it allows a VNSA to act with impunity, with the secondary benefit of having immediate 
access to potential chemical weapons or chemical weapon precursors. According to Geoffrey 
Chapman, while exploring chemical weapon usage patterns associated with Salafi-Jihadist 
groups: 
“As both Al-Nusra and IS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] have had control 
over territory they are free to operate with relative impunity compared to a 
cell-based terrorist group in a hostile state.  Control over territory has also 
meant easy access to chlorine which is used ubiquitously for sanitation. In 
December 2012, Al-Nusra captured the SYSACCO plant near Aleppo and 
reportedly removed 200 tonnes of chlorine. Similarly, IS allegedly 
appropriated chlorine from water treatment facilities in territory it held.”143 
A secondary effect in securing safe haven for both ISIS and Aum Shinrikyo was a natural 
tendency for both groups to gravitate toward a bureaucratic or hierarchical structure. Akin to a 
state, once Aum Shinrikyo and ISIS acquired safe haven there appears to have been a tendency 
for both VNSAs to structure themselves in such a way to effectively “govern” these spaces. Aum 
Shinrikyo for instance was organized under various ministries (commerce, construction, defense, 
finance, education, etc.) 144 while ISIS was similarly bureaucratic. According to Stanford’s 
Center for International Security and Cooperation: 
                                                          
142 "MMP: Islamic State." FSI | CISAC - CISAC. Accessed June 15, 2021. 
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-state#highlight_text_12400.  
143 Chapman, Geoffrey. "Islamic State and Al-Nusra: Exploring Determinants of Chemical Weapons Usage Patterns." 
Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 6 (2017): 112-21. Accessed June 21, 2021. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/26295960    
144 Sageman, Marc and Terrance Leighton, Lloyd Hough, Hidemi Yuki, Rui Kotani and Zachary M. Hosfor, “Aum 
Shinrikyo Insights into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons,” Centers for a New American 
Security, July 2011: Pg. 12. 
33 
 
“As IS [ISIS] accumulated more territory, the creation of a bureaucracy and 
establishment of a functioning state became a central goal of the organization. 
IS created a complex taxation system to fund government programs and 
military campaigns, and the group used the threat of violence to ensure these 
state services functioned efficiently.”145 
VNSAs organized under this type of system function much more efficiently. David Tucker 
highlights VNSA organizational efficiencies attributed to hierarchical constructs but also 
provides the caveat that bureaucracies tend to slow down the decision-making process: 
“Hierarchies, or more exactly organizations with centralized control, provide 
accountability and can enforce standards. They also can implement decisions 
more quickly and efficiently than networks, or organizations without 
centralized control, but they may make those decisions more slowly than the 
speed at which their environment is changing, since information must travel 
through many layers to get to decision makers.”146 
An additional noteworthy effect was the correlation between an influx of personnel and 
establishing safe haven. For Aum Shinrikyo as more individuals joined the group, this 
necessitated expanding “communal facilities.” 147 For ISIS, the group would seize large swaths 
of territory, which would largely inspire individuals to migrate in support of the “established 
caliphate.” 148 In either instance, safe haven seems to promote a flow of personnel, some of 
which probably included technical experts responsible for both respective VNSA chemical 
weapon efforts. 
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Factors Aum Shinrikyo ISIS 




Possessed Funding   






Possessed An Ability to 




When considering the technical experts associated with Aum Shinrikyo and ISIS, there is little 
doubt that Masami Tsuchiya and Abu Malik served instrumental roles within their respective 
organizations and that their technical expertise was a factor that impacted the development and 
use of chemical weapons by these VNSAs. However, both groups arguably needed the time and 
space or safe haven in order to achieve their group’s chemical weapon efforts.  
Separately, it is of interest that a multitude of efforts were being tested or trialed until a final 
decision was made with how to allocate resources accordingly. For example, Aum Shinrikyo 
while having decided to pursue a sarin weaponization project had also tested biological weapons, 
which ultimately failed. 149 ISIS, while attempting to solidify control of territory, was noted as 
having used chlorine gas before making a transition to sulfur mustard. 150 These testing or trial 
periods are important for VNSA chemical weapon efforts and reinforce the time and space or 
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safe haven argument; essentially highlighting a need for experts to see what works and what does 
not. This can be further exemplified in another publication from Joby Warrick, where ISIS 
conducted chemical weapon experiments on Iraqi prisoners after having seized territory: 
“The previously unknown experiments happened sometime after 2014, when 
the Islamic State seized control of Mosul and commandeered the city’s main 
university as a research center for new kinds of weapons, according to the 
report by a panel appointed by the U.N. Security Council to investigate war 
crimes by the extremist group. At least some of the prisoners died, the report 
said. The investigators examined reports of prisoners being exposed to 
thallium, a highly toxic chemical used historically as a rat poison, as well as 
nicotine, which is lethal in high doses. U.N. officials also are exploring the 
Islamic State’s efforts to weaponize chlorine and manufacture sulfur mustard, 
the chemical weapon commonly known as mustard gas that was used to kill 
and maim thousands of soldiers in World War I.”151 
An additional discussion point in terms of technical expertise is the divergence amongst the 
groups in terms of the tacit knowledge barriers and agents of choice. As previously identified, 
tacit knowledge is somewhat more elusive as it tends to rely on “hands on” understanding in a 
relevant field, making it harder to codify and difficult to transfer.152 With Aum Shinrikyo, 
Masami Tsuchiya was heavily relied upon for his knowledge and highlights instances whereby 
others without his skill set hampered production efforts: 
“Tsuchiya felt that the plant was well run under Takizawa but operations were 
handicapped by the principals’ limited knowledge of chemistry. Errors 
occurred. A leading example, according to Tsuchiya, was that in February and 
March 1994 Nakagawa added too much isopropyl alcohol during the difficult 
fifth and final step of the synthetic process.”153 
                                                          
151 Warrick, Joby. "ISIS used chemical weapons on Iraqi prisoners, U.N. investigators find." The Washington Post. 
Last modified May 13, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/isis-chemical-weapons-
experiments-mosul/2021/05/13/bbfebfb0-b42e-11eb-a980-a60af976ed44_story.html.  
152 Jackson, Brian A., Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by Lessons from 
Private Sector Technology Adoption. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1248.html. Pg. 8-9. 
153 Sageman, Marc and Terrance Leighton, Lloyd Hough, Hidemi Yuki, Rui Kotani and Zachary M. Hosfor, “Aum 
Shinrikyo Insights into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical Weapons,” Centers for a New American 
Security, July 2011: Pg. 29. 
36 
 
Conversely, even after Abu Malik was killed in 2015, ISIS was still able to produce sulfur 
mustard.154 The following graphic, sourced from West Point’s Counter Terrorism Center, details 
ISIS’s chemical weapon use between 2014 to 2017:155 
 
Figure 6: ISIS Chemical Weapon Attacks in Iraq and Syria156 
 
What this suggests is that tacit knowledge and agent choice are linked, i.e., sarin is more 
technically complex requiring more tacit knowledge, whereas sulfur mustard is less technically 
complex requiring less tacit knowledge. The implication of this is that VNSAs, if inclined may 
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pursue chemical weapon efforts that are technically easier, requiring less tacit knowledge and 
understanding. 
Factors Aum Shinrikyo ISIS 




Possessed Funding   






Possessed An Ability to 




Although data is not available for providing specific financial breakdowns for ISIS or Aum 
Shinrikyo’s chemical weapon efforts, several key items can be inferred. Broadly speaking, when 
both organizations reached their peak, they had a significant ability to accrue funding. 
Furthermore, a peak in funding also aligned very much with a realized chemical weapon effort. 
This suggests that funding provides VNSAs with operational flexibility to pursue special projects 
such as chemical weapon efforts. However, an important caveat is that financing chemical 
weapon efforts takes into account purchasing equipment or unique precursor chemicals for 
manufacturing or production pathways. Outside of purchasing these items, some VNSAs may 
steal or repurpose industrial chemicals, which is not capital intensive. Unstable states or regions 
where the VNSA is empowered to operate permissibly, could also take advantage of a state’s 
inability to control chemical stockpiles, as Ackerman states: 
“In the event that a VNSA pursues a ready-made chemical weapon, it might do 
so through theft…unstable states might also lose control of these weapons, as 
has been reported in the case of Syria and Iraq, where the Islamic State of Iraq 
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and the Levant (ISIL) allegedly gained access to weapons stockpiles of the 
Syrian and former Iraqi regimes.”157 
ISIS and Aum Shinrikyo both derived the vast majority of their funding from established safe 
havens, which reinforces the importance of these permissible operating spaces. What’s more, 
financing would allow these groups to build up chemical weapon capabilities within their own 
operating areas. When Aum Shinrikyo decided to move from small scale to production-scale 
sarin efforts, the group would do so at a location identified as Satyan 7.158 Satyan 7 under the 
guise of an Aum Shinrikyo shrine was in reality a large-scale chemical weapon production 
facility with legitimately purchased top-of-the-line equipment.159 According to a United Nations 
report, the compound and its contents cost approximately $30 million. 160  
Factors Aum Shinrikyo ISIS 




Possessed Funding Yes Yes 






Possessed An Ability to 




Production facilities, like funding and the recruitment of technical experts, are arguably tied to 
the safe haven nexus with these facilities being physically located within a VNSA’s territorial 
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control or permissible operating environment. Furthermore, production facilities also play a 
determining factor as they relate to the effectiveness of a chemical weapon effort. For example, 
production facilities producing large quantities of an agent may vary wildly in yield, purity, or 
virulence. ISIS was able to probably produce large quantities of sulfur mustard but statements 
released indicated the following: 
“Explosions had released ‘a yellow gas with a strong smell of onions,’ and that 
‘the ground immediately around the impact sites was stained with an olive-
green liquid that turned to a golden yellow after exposure to sunshine.’” 161 
Based on this description and supported in other press reporting,162 ISIS’s sulfur mustard was 
impure, suggesting flaws either in the production process or mistakes inherent to the 
methodological approach the group was using to produce this agent. According to the U.S. 
National Center for Biotechnology Information, when sulfur mustard is in its purest form it is 
odorless and colorless and when low grade chemical additives are introduced can produce an 
onion or garlic smell.163 
Conversely, in 1993, Aum Shinrikyo was able to refine its production processes and achieve a 90 
percent purity rate for sarin at bench scale only to have purity plummet when seeking to achieve 
industrial production.164 The implication is that VNSAs seriously considering chemical weapon 
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pursuits should understand that large scale or production-grade capacity could be dramatically 
more difficult than research or bench scale efforts.  
Factors Aum Shinrikyo ISIS 




Possessed Funding Yes Yes 






Possessed An Ability to 




Leadership endorsement for a VNSA chemical weapon effort stresses the intentions of the group, 
whereas other factors focus more on capability. The wider consideration for a VNSA chemical 
weapon effort is that if a group is able to acquire safe haven and all other factors, this does not 
lead to a chemical weapon pursuit without an intent. The rationale here is a VNSA leader may 
consider chemical weapon initiatives to be a waste of resources or there may be a fear of harsh 
reprisal from counterterrorism forces that could threaten the group’s integrity. In effect, 
leadership endorsement may be an antecedent variable, which “occurs before the independent 
and dependent variables… and can help explain the relationship between the two.”165 
Factors Aum Shinrikyo ISIS 
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Possessed An Ability to 




What is unique about the VNSA factor regarding an ability to change approaches to technology 
is that it can be a determinant of a group’s survival. If a VNSA is unable to plan for 
contingencies to change their systems or processes then their initiatives, to include chemical 
weaponization, can be disrupted. However, if a group is able to adopt new technologies or 
modify practices to circumvent counterterrorism pressure then they can prosper.  
Aum Shinrikyo, failed to plan accordingly and adopt technological practices or systems that 
would preserve the integrity of the organization. ISIS, however, would implement various 
changes in their TTPs that ensured their viability, not only as a terrorist organization but allow 
them to potentially conduct future chemical weapon attacks. The justification for this is the 
aforementioned ability to archive and potentially disseminate chemical weapon information166 or 
the ability to enable attack plots that do not necessitate high degrees of technical expertise and 
the acquisition of elaborate precursor materials – such as hydrogen sulfide. 167 What’s more is 
that ISIS has an extensive global network of affiliates that they may exploit to conduct potential 
chemical weapon attack plots. 168  
Factors Aum Shinrikyo ISIS 
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Possessed Funding Yes Yes 






Possessed An Ability to 




Comparative Analysis and Findings 
Using Aum Shinrikyo as a baseline and having compared this to the more contemporary VNSA 
group ISIS, we can see what factors impacted the development and use of chemical weapons by 
these VNSAs. Our hypothesis for this study proved correct in that an increase in available safe 
haven or an ability to change approaches to technology makes a VNSA chemical weapon effort 
more likely.  
Factors Aum Shinrikyo ISIS 




Possessed Funding Yes Yes 






Possessed An Ability to 




By examining the chemical weapon factors between these exemplar cases, it was determined, 
that safe haven was foundational and allowed for the acquisition of technical experts, 
accumulation of funding, and the establishment of production facilities. Leadership between 
these organizations informed this study by indicating that it served more as the “intention” 
associated with a VNSA chemical weapon effort. Finally, an ability to change approaches to 
43 
 
technology was a key factor as it inferred that if a group does not have contingency planning 
related to a change in systems and approaches or make use of practical technological 
advancement then there is a tendency for the organization to be disrupted or destroyed. 
After having examined these chemical weapon factors with respect to Aum Shinrikyo and ISIS, 
it’s important to revisit the idea that a number of these factors could also apply to conventional 
weapon pursuits or other innovative engineering projects. As we identified earlier in the paper, 
the FARC used the jungle as a safe haven to create “Narco-subs” but was not inclined to pursue 
chemical weapons; the decision of which was likely based on the direction of VNSA 
leadership.169 The importance of this example resonates with being able to identify unique 
indicators for a chemical weapon effort v. other engineering projects. Beyond having insight into 
VNSA leadership intentions, other indicators of a chemical weapon effort could involve the 
acquisition of specialized precursor materials. From this perspective, Aum Shinrikyo developed 
the nerve agent sarin, a principle precursor of which is O-Isopropyl 
methylphosphonofluoridate.170 Separately, ISIS developed sulfur mustard, and some of the key 
precursors include 2-Chloroethylchloromethylsulfide and Bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide.171 
Essentially, these are chemical weapon precursors unique to these efforts and would not be 
applicable toward explosive production routes. Figure 7 and 8 provide additional context in 
terms of the chemical composition of the nerve and blister agents under consideration: 
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Figure 7: Chemical Structure of Nerve Agents172 
 
Figure 8: Chemical Structure of Blister Agents173 
                                                          





Conversely, if a VNSA were considering a conventional weapon pursuit or explosive weapon 
effort, they would likely seek several of the following precursors: acetone, aluminum powder, 
ammonium nitrate, hydrogen peroxide, nitric acid, glycerin, and potassium permanganate.174 
These precursors differ significantly from the chemical precursors required for a sarin and sulfur 
mustard effort. As such, identifying these unique indicators may provide the timely warning 
needed in order to counter a VNSA chemical weapon effort.  
When separately examining safe haven and an ability to change approaches to technology, the 
latter of these two factors might actually end up being more important than the former. For 
example, if a VNSA decides to pursue a chemical weapon effort whereby there is a technology 
or strategy that “de-skills” the effort or the agent of choice is not dependent on safe haven then a 
VNSA could be placed in an advantaged position. As such, technical expertise might not be 
needed to deploy a simplistic chemical weapon – for example, using a drone to deliver a 
simplistic toxic gas (hydrogen sulfide, hydrogen cyanide, chlorine, etc.). Furthermore, if safe 
haven is no longer a requisite and the chemical agent is simplistic then the VNSA can allocate 
more assets to develop an optimal delivery platform, instead of investing an inordinate amount of 
time perfecting a chemical agent that could be overly complex. Scholars and national security 
personnel alike have considered innovative scenarios whereby VNSAs could potentially use 
drone technologies in combination with WMD materials.175  
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As far back as 1999, Abu Mus’ab al Zarqawi displayed an interest in unconventional or chemical 
weapons.176 By 2014, ISIS began using drones to gather battlefield intelligence and shortly 
thereafter the group would weaponize these same platforms to drop explosive munitions.177 
Although we have yet to see a chemical weapon drone platform used by ISIS, the concern is that 
ISIS continues to maintain a chemical weapon interest – as voiced by the ISIS spokesman just 
last year178 – and has also displayed a proficiency for drone use in a battlefield context. Beyond 
maintaining an interest in chemical weapons, the group also commands an ability to not only 
archive179 chemical weapon data but also transmit this information to ISIS members worldwide. 
180 Koblentz, effectively conveys the increasing threats faced by security officials with the 
potential marriage of drone technologies and WMD, as followed: 
“Finally, UAVs could one day be used to deliver a weapon of mass 
destruction. Nuclear weapons will remain too large and heavy for delivery by 
the type of UAV that a non-state actor could build or buy, but other types of 
CBRN weapons could be delivered by drones. The small-payload, low-speed, 
and low-altitude flight profile of UAVs make them well suited for delivering 
chemical and biological agents against civilian targets. A crop-spraying drone 
designed for use in the developing world can carry twenty liters of pesticides—
or sarin.” 181 
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Limitations and Future Research 
When considering the limitations associated with this research study, more data points or 
additional VNSA groups could have been considered as part of the comparative analysis. This 
expansion of the number of VNSAs could have included groups that considered but failed to 
achieve a chemical weapon effort. Additionally, it may have also proved beneficial as a 
supplementary data point to examine a VNSA that did not pursue chemical weapon efforts, but 
could seemingly have the capability. An example of a group that has robust capabilities but does 
not have a discernable chemical weapon effort is Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), according to the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: 
“LeT operates a robust above-ground infrastructure that, combined with 
investments in legitimate enterprises in Pakistan and fundraising networks 
abroad, has enabled it to operate independent of direct ISI financial support. 
While it continues to enjoy reach-back capability into the Pakistani military 
and ISI, LeT also has leveraged its financial resources and operational freedom 
to develop an educated cadre among its membership. Collectively, these 
individuals amplify technical, training, and planning capabilities.”182 
With this in mind, future research could be conducted against VNSAs who have yet to explicitly 
pursue chemical weapon efforts. This research could involve examining these groups against our 
factors. Essentially, if a group has a potentially robust capability such as LeT, then scholarship 
could take a proactive stance in addressing the chemical weapon threat prior to it being realized. 
An approach could also be taken to examine multiple VNSAs under Forest’s practical and 
strategic constraint theories, whereby the scholarship could categorically assign VNSAs a 
chemical weapon threat level (such as low, moderate, or high).183 
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Having examined and assessed the factors associated with a historic and contemporary VNSA’s 
chemical weapon effort and determined that an increase in available safe haven or an ability to 
change approaches to technology makes a VNSA chemical weapon effort more likely, there are 
several recommendations to consider. First, states should continue to monitor for key indicators 
specific to VNSA chemical weapon efforts. These may be differentiated from conventional 
weapon efforts by looking for a combination of procurement and recruitment initiatives that 
would align with a chemical weapon end state. Examples of these indicators could be VNSAs 
purchasing specialized precursor materials, explicitly expressing chemical weapon intentions, 
and the recruitment of experienced chemists. Mary Zalesny takes this one-step further by 
providing additional indicators, while also providing the caveat that some of these observables 
may not be obvious: 
“Direct observation of group actions suggestive of interest or intent to use 
CBW may be difficult. However, other evidence indicative of intent may be 
available. Technical manuals related to chemical and biological agents, 
equipment to manufacture chemical or biological agents, or receipts for the 
purchase of agents or equipment found at a group’s current or previous 
location all reflect at least an interest in chemical or biological agents. The 
arrest of a group member in possession of such materials, a group’s 
association, partnership with suppliers or users of chemical- or biological-
related materials, or third-party observations or statements would also 
constitute evidence of interest or intent.”184 
Next, states should continue to deprive ISIS of safe haven. The denial of these permissible 
operating environments not only inhibit the ability for ISIS to train, recruit, and incur revenue 
but the lack of safe haven also disrupts ISIS from pursuing chemical weapon or other 
unconventional efforts. However, as national security priorities shift and the U.S. withdraws 
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from nations like Afghanistan this could give ISIS an opportunity to expand and take these 
operating spaces. According to a press release on this matter: 
“Seth Jones, a senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies in Washington, D.C., raised concerns about chaos following a post-
withdrawal from Afghanistan that ISIS might take the opportunity to seize, 
saying the issue is that ISIS ‘will be able to find additional space to 
operate.’”185 
As priorities shift, accommodative measures should be taken by states to ensure nations like 
Afghanistan have the necessary financial and governance support to combat VNSA resurgence 
within these regions.  
Additionally, states should seek to maintain competitive advantages in emerging technologies 
that could be used to enable chemical weapon efforts. This means understanding the potential for 
ISIS to abuse emerging technologies such as drones. To a certain extent counter-drone 
technologies have been developed to disrupt drone flight. These technologies are a combination 
of detection platforms and instruments that destroy or disable the drone. According to a private 
consulting firm on the matter: 
“The technology depends on a variety of techniques for detecting or 
intercepting drones. Mostly drones are spotted using techniques like Radio 
Frequency (RF) detection, Electro-Optical and Infrared and are then destroyed 
with techniques like RF Jamming, GNSS Jamming, Spoofing, Laser, nets, 
projectile or Combined Interdiction Elements.”186 
It is important to note that states that seek to develop these types of countermeasures are 
compelled, at often-great expense, to develop these technologies that are reactive instead of 
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proactive. An organization like ISIS being much more agile has the potential to adopt other 
emerging technology that has yet to have a countermeasure. As such, states should be 
imaginative in their approach and stay ahead of potential emerging technology concerns. 
Another recourse for an ISIS chemical weapon effort that states should be aware of is the 
potential for attack plots similar to the Australia plot conducted in 2017 187 whereby a group 
could opt for simplistic toxic gas forming reactions such as hydrogen sulfide, which require 
precursor materials that are readily available. This presents the most difficult concern for state 
security forces as precursor materials that are widely available are often dual use and often do 
not raise concern during their acquisition. As such, state resources should be allocated 
accordingly to law enforcement and intelligence organizations, in order take preventative action 
against VNSAs seeking to conduct simplistic toxic gas attacks. Additionally, Koblentz provides 
the following insight as to how the international community can continue to respond to this 
concern: 
“Given the high degree of dual-use, diffusion, and decentralization associated 
with these emerging technologies, preventing non-state actors from acquiring 
and using them to cause harm will require international cooperation… One of 
the international community’s most important tools for preventing nonstate 
actors from acquiring CBRN weapons is Resolution 1540, approved by the UN 
Security Council in 2004. Resolution 1540 requires member states to 
strengthen border security, physical protection, domestic controls, and export 





                                                          
187 McKirdy, Euan, and Karen Smith. "Foiled Plot to Blow Up Plane, Unleash Gas Revealed in Australia." CNN. Last 
modified August 5, 2017. https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/03/asia/australia-plane-terror-plot-isis/index.html.  
188 Koblentz, Gregory D. "Emerging Technologies and the Future of CBRN Terrorism." The Washington Quarterly 43, 




"Aum Shinrikyo (Aleph)." The Mackenzie Institute. Accessed June 16, 2021. 
https://mackenzieinstitute.com/2015/12/aum-shinrikyo-aleph/.  
"Country Reports on Terrorism 2019." United States Department of State. Last modified June 
24, 2020. https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/.  
"Chemical and Explosives Terrorism." INTERPOL | The International Criminal Police 
Organization. Accessed July 26, 2021. https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Terrorism/Chemical-
and-Explosives-terrorism.  
"Federation of American Scientists :: Chemical Weapons Production and Storage." Federation 
Of American Scientists – Science for a Safer, More Informed World. Last modified September 9, 
2013. https://fas.org/programs/bio/chemweapons/production.html. 
"ISIS Chemical Weapons Expert ‘killed’ in Airstrike." Al Arabiya English. Last modified May 
20, 2020. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2015/01/31/U-S-Coalition-strike-kills-
ISIS-chemical-weapons-expert-. 
"ISIS Chemical Weapon Specialist Was ‘Gathering Equipment’ Before He Was Killed." The 
Daily Beast. Last modified January 31, 2015. https://www.thedailybeast.com/isis-chemical-
weapon-specialist-was-gathering-equipment-before-he-was-killed.  
"Millennialism | Definition, History, & Facts." Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed June 6, 2021. 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/millennialism. 
"MMP: Islamic State." FSI | CISAC - CISAC. Accessed June 15, 2021. 
https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/islamic-state#highlight_text_12400.  
"North Atlantic Assembly AN 255 STC(96) 10 - CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL 
WEAPONS: THE POOR MAN'S BOMB." Federation of American Scientists. Last modified 
October 4, 1996. https://fas.org/irp/threat/an253stc.htm. 
"Schedule 1." OPCW. Accessed July 27, 2021. https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-
convention/annexes/annex-chemicals/schedule-1. 
"Sulfur_mustard." Chemeurope.com - The Chemistry Information Portal from Laboratory to 
Process. Accessed July 5, 2021. 
https://www.chemeurope.com/en/encyclopedia/Sulfur_mustard.html.  
"THE TRANSNATIONAL THREAT." Federation Of American Scientists – Science for a Safer, 
More Informed World. Accessed June 16, 2021. https://fas.org/irp/threat/prolif97/trans.html.  
"The War Against ‘Islamic State’ in Maps and Charts." BBC News. Last modified March 28, 
2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27838034.  
"Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State." Wilson Center. Accessed July 5, 
2021. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state.  
52 
 
"The use of the Internet for terrorist purposes." United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Last 
modified 2012. 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf. 
"What is an Antecedent Variable? (Explanation & Example)." Statology. Last modified 
September 25, 2020. https://www.statology.org/antecedent-variable/.  
Ackerman, Gary A. "Anatomizing Chemical and Biological Non-State Adversaries." Calhoun: 
The NPS Institutional Archive, January 2014, 1-355. 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36738176.pdf. 
Ackerman, Gary A. "Comparative Analysis of VNSA Complex Engineering Efforts." Journal of 
Strategic Security9, no. 1 (2016) : 119-133. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.9.1.1511 
Ackerman, Gary A. "'More Bang for the Buck': Examining the Determinants of Terrorist 
Adoption of New Weapons Technologies" (Ph.D. Dissertation: King's College London, 2014), 
pp. 19. 
Ackerman, Gary, and Jeremy Tamsett. "Islamist Use and Pursuit of CBRN Terrorism." In 
Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 339-340. Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2009. 
Ackerman, Gary, and Michelle Jacome. "WMD Terrorism: The Once and Future Threat." 
PRISM, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction 7, no. 3 (2018), 22-36. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26470532. 
Chapman, Geoffrey. "Islamic State and Al-Nusra: Exploring Determinants of Chemical 
Weapons Usage Patterns." Perspectives on Terrorism 11, no. 6 (2017): 112-21. Accessed June 
21, 2021. 
Choudhary, Mahashreveta. "Top Five Counter-drone Technologies." Geospatial World. Last 
modified July 12, 2019. https://www.geospatialworld.net/blogs/top-five-counter-drone-
technologies/.  
Cornish, Paul. "The CBRN System: Assessing the Threat of Terrorist Use of Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Weapons in the United Kingdom." Chatham House, 
February 2007, 1-40. https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/wps/riia/0001540/0001540.pdf. 
Daniels, Jeff. "Terrorists Have a Cheap New Weapon That's Surprisingly Simple to Deploy." 
CNBC. Accessed July 5, 2021. https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/24/terrorists-have-a-cheap-new-
weapon-thats-surprisingly-simple-to-deploy.html.  
Fletcher, Holly. "Aum Shinrikyo." Council on Foreign Relations. Last modified November 18, 
2005. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/aum-shinrikyo.  
Forest, James J.F. "Framework for Analyzing the Future Threat of WMD Terrorism." Journal of 




Heibner, Stefan, Peter Neumann, John Holland-McCowan, and Rajan Basra. "Caliphate in 
Decline: An Estimate of Islamic State’s Financial Fortunes." The International Centre for the 
Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2017, 1-20. 
Hummel, Stephen. "Small Groups, Big Weapons: The Nexus of Emerging Technologies and 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Last 
modified April 2, 2020. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/small-groups-big-weapons-the-nexus-of-
emerging-technologies-and-weapons-of-mass-destruction-terrorism/. 
Jabbari, Cyrus, and Philipp Bleek. "Honey, I Shrunk the Lab: Emerging Microfluidics 
Technology and its Implications for Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Weapons." Emergence 
and Convergence, no. 5 (May 2019), 1-23. 
https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Portals/97/EC%20research%20paper%20no%205%20-
%20Bleek%20and%20Jabbari.pdf.  
Jackson, Brian A., Technology Acquisition by Terrorist Groups: Threat Assessment Informed by 
Lessons from Private Sector Technology Adoption. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2001. https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1248.html. Pg. 8-9. 
Jefferson, Catherine, Filippa Lentzos, and Claire Marris. "Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: 
Challenging the â€œMythsâ€." Frontiers in Public Health 2 (2014). 
doi:10.3389/fpubh.2014.00115.  
Joscelyn, Thomas. "US Designates ISIS Chemical Weapons Expert from France As Terrorist." 
FDD's Long War Journal. Last modified March 22, 2018. 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/03/us-designates-isis-chemical-weapons-expert-
from-france-as-terrorist.php.  
JERUSALEM POST STAFF. "ISIS Calls on Operatives to Target Jews with Chemical 
Weapons." The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com. Last modified January 28, 2020. 
https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/isis-we-need-to-conquer-israeli-settlements-start-
targeting-jews-615535.  
Koblentz, Gregory D. "Emerging Technologies and the Future of CBRN Terrorism." The 
Washington Quarterly 43, no. 2 (2020), 177-196. doi:10.1080/0163660x.2020.1770969. Pg. 178-
184. 
Marnin, Julia. "U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan May Give ISIS 'space to Operate,' Expert 
Says." Newsweek. Last modified April 27, 2021. https://www.newsweek.com/us-withdrawal-
afghanistan-may-give-isis-space-operate-expert-says-1586854.  
McKirdy, Euan, and Karen Smith. "Foiled Plot to Blow Up Plane, Unleash Gas Revealed in 
Australia." CNN. Last modified August 5, 2017. https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/03/asia/australia-
plane-terror-plot-isis/index.html.  
Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf. "Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?" 





Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf. Islam and the Bomb: Religious Justification For and Against Nuclear 
Bombs (Massachusetts: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2011), Pg. 20. 
Olson, Kyle B. "Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?" Emerging Infectious Diseases 5, no. 
4 (1999), 413-416. doi:10.3201/eid0504.990409. 
PubChem. "Mustard Gas." National Center for Biotechnology Information. Accessed 
June 23, 2021. https://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/compound/Mustard-gas.  
Sageman, Marc and Terrance Leighton, Lloyd Hough, Hidemi Yuki, Rui Kotani and Zachary M. 
Hosfor, “Aum Shinrikyo Insights into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical 
Weapons,” Centers for a New American Security, July 2011: Pg. 1-68. 
Schmitt, Eric. "ISIS Used Chemical Arms at Least 52 Times in Syria and Iraq, Report Says 
(Published 2016)." The New York Times - Breaking News, US News, World News and Videos. 
Last modified November 22, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/world/middleeast/isis-
chemical-weapons-syria-iraq-mosul.html.  
Skinner, Harold. "Shell | International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1)." 1914-
1918-Online. International Encyclopedia of the First World War (WW1). Accessed June 17, 
2021. https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/shell.  
Smith, Saphora. "Down but Not Out: Why ISIS Will Still Be a Threat in 2018." NBC News. Last 
modified December 27, 2017. https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-will-remain-
threat-2018-experts-warn-n828146.  
Staff, Reuters. "U.S. Says ISIS Evolved to Become a Global Network That Inspires Attacks 
Worldwide." U.S. Last modified June 24, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-security-
extremists/u-s-says-isis-evolved-to-become-a-global-network-that-inspires-attacks-worldwide-
idUSKBN23V2CT.  
Strack, Columb. "The Evolution of the Islamic State’s Chemical Weapons Efforts – Combating 
Terrorism Center at West Point." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Last modified 
January 12, 2018. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/the-evolution-of-the-islamic-states-chemical-
weapons-efforts/.  
Tankel, Stephen. "Lashkar-e-Taiba Capable of Threatening U.S. Homeland." Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. Last modified June 12, 2013. 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/06/12/lashkar-e-taiba-capable-of-threatening-u.s.-
homeland-pub-52081. 
Tucker, David. “Terrorism, Networks, and Strategy: Why the Conventional Wisdom is Wrong.” 
Homeland Security Affairs 4, Article 5 (June 2008). https://www.hsaj.org/articles/122  
Tucker, Jonathan B. "Chapter 14: Lessons from the Case Studies." In Toxic Terror: Assessing 
Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, 267. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000. 
55 
 
Tucker, Jonathan B. "The Future of Chemical Weapons." The New Atlantis. Last modified 
September 26, 2020. https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-future-of-chemical-
weapons. 
Warrick, Joby. "Exclusive: Iraqi scientist says he helped ISIS make chemical weapons." The 




Warrick, Joby. "How the Pentagon Got Inside ISIS’ Chemical Weapons Operation—and Ended 
It." POLITICO. Last modified February 27, 2021. 
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/02/27/red-line-book-excerpt-chemical-weapons-
syria-471784. 
Warrick, Joby. "ISIS used chemical weapons on Iraqi prisoners, U.N. investigators find." The 
Washington Post. Last modified May 13, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-
security/isis-chemical-weapons-experiments-mosul/2021/05/13/bbfebfb0-b42e-11eb-a980-
a60af976ed44_story.html.  
Warrick, Joby. "Use of weaponized drones by ISIS spurs terrorism fears." The Washington Post. 
Last modified February 21, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/use-
of-weaponized-drones-by-isis-spurs-terrorism-fears/2017/02/21/9d83d51e-f382-11e6-8d72-
263470bf0401_story.html.  
Wojcik, Daniel. "Embracing Doomsday: Faith, Fatalism, and Apocalyptic Beliefs in the Nuclear 
Age." Western Folklore 55, no. 4 (1996), 297. doi:10.2307/1500138. Pg. 298. 
Wood, Graeme. "What ISIS Really Wants." The Atlantic. Last modified February 15, 2015. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/. 
Zalesny, Mary, Paul Whitney, and Amanda White. "A Conceptual Model to Identify Intent to 













Patrick Lucey was born in 1985 in Colorado Springs, CO. He graduated with a BS in 
Mathematics from The College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, VA in 2008. He enlisted 
into the U.S. Army in 2010 as an infantryman. During his enlistment, he completed a MA in 
Security Studies from American Military University. Upon leaving military service, he attended 
George Mason University in Fairfax, VA and completed a MA in Biodefense in 2017. In 2015, 
he became an intelligence analyst for the Department of Defense. He anticipates graduating in 
August 2021 with a MA in Global Security Studies from Johns Hopkins University in 
Washington D.C. 
